Scepticism regarding the Nature of God

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Scepticism regarding the Nature of God

Page 6

If some sort of infinity opens before our intellect, the whole known part of reality shrinks to a comparable minimum of 'the given'; what has to be conceived of as the absolute whole of reality, of which nothing is 'given', would then have to be coordinated epistemologically to the most free and most intensive constructive faculty possible of the reality of the mind. Infinity of the 'not given' correlates to the activity of thecomplete, unfettered yet systematic imagination.

The philosophical mind, it seems, has always been terrified by these two concepts: the unknown side of reality and imagination. They undoubtedly belong together. Faced with considering the 'unknown', one is very ready to state that nothing can be said about it and be inclined to leave this sterile subject altogether; identifying that which is not to hand, or at least, that which is unknown with that which it is not worth troubling about. Indeed, the very word, 'unknown' is used, by definition, to settle all difficulties; one sticks to the word. Yet the unknown region of the world has to be indispensable; it has to supplement the known part of the world in order to form the Whole of existence. In that whole, the unknown is unavoidable, even though here, when facing the Whole of Reality, our intellect is pushing into a vacuum, into emptiness.

The Whole and the Unknown offer us no way of grasping them, no tool to prevent reality from sinking into the ocean of infinity. The intellect of science, however, tries to remain on the firm land of facts because the scientist does not believe that there might be methods of dealing, however approximately,with the idea and the subject of the Whole of Reality in any other than a formal, mathematical way - the way that calculates content, And yet, not only is there such a way, there is even a special capability of the mind, enabling a construct of the Whole of Reality of the world. The whole can, indeed, be described in formal, complete propositions, - not formal in the mathematical sense - by laying bare attributes of Wholeness that can prevent the confusion of that which can truly be termed a Whole with the conglomerate, 'all actually existing things', a notion that proves to be un-thinkable, both as constituting the Whole and as fulfilling the meaning of Existence. That is so because we need, first, to form the notion of a true All, taking into account that neither the whole world, as it is usually thought of, nor any special prolongation or extension of it would represent this All. Again, the idea and the subject of this All can only be elaborated by the, unfettered yet systematic, imagination. Existence and the Whole is one and the same.


It is the character of philosophical statements that they are, essentially,incomplete propositions.

In so far as they claim to be complete propositions, they are untrue, because the object of their propositions does not admit of any complete statement.

As opposed to philosophical statements, mathematical statements are perfectly complete propositions.

Statements of science attain a high degree of completeness (the quality of being self contained), Statements of science are, in a way, in the middle, between philosophical and mathematical statements.

Philosophical statements are not 'probable' statements; all of them are true in so far as they are systematic; all are false where their systematicality ends. (cf also my essay, 'Why Philosophy is no Science').


The All is, and only the All, which cannot be surpassed by thought or in thought, is.

Everything that exists, exists only by belonging to the All.

Yet the fact that 'the All is' cannot be found or proved by contemplating or considering what already really is; only by considering what could be or what ought to be, (which, ultimately means the same thing). In other words, it is not by starting with that which actually is the case that what actually is the case can be found. It is only by starting with what is possible that that which actually is can be discovered. The starting point must therefore be the broadest thinkable scheme of the possible.i.e the All envisaged by the systematic imagination, because we can only find out what is really thinkable by considering what goes to and fro between the attempted thinkable and what can be said to be real. The really possible (which is, cosmically, the same as the real) can only be found through a connecting comparison between that which is actual and the attempted thinkable. The Possible real, i.e. the non-actual real cannot be found by considering only the second real, i.e. by aiming for the Possible real directly. Really thinkable, systematically imagined, possible real, actual real or the All - all these terms are one and the same. All is the essence and the meaning of existence, of to be.